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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of labor market policies on growth
and unemployment in labor-exporting countries in the Middle East
and North Africa. The analysis is based on a framework that cap-
tures many of the main features of the labor market in these coun-
tries. We conduct a variety of policy experiments, including a reduc-
tion in payroll taxation, cuts in public sector wages and employment,
an increase in employment subsidies, a reduction in trade unions’ bar-
gaining power, and a composite reform program. Our key message
is that to foster broad-based growth and job creation in the region,
labor market reforms must not be viewed in isolation but rather as a
component of a comprehensive program of structural reforms.
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21 Introduction
Like other developing regions in the post-World War II era, the demographic
transition in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has given
rise to rapid labor force growth. But with an average growth rate above
3 percent since the 1960s, no other region comes close to the magnitude
and persistence of MENA’s labor market pressures. And while employment
growth was relatively strong in the 1970s, it failed to keep pace with the
expansion of the labor force during the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, MENA
recorded some of the highest unemployment rates among developing regions
in the 1990s. Recent estimates indicate that unemployment rates range from
about 2.3 percent in the United Arab Emirates to close to 29.8 percent in
Algeria (see World Bank (2004)). For the region as a whole, the unemploy-
ment rate is currently estimated at 15 percent of the labor force.1 Based
on current trends in job creation, the prospects for absorbing new entrants
into labor markets and those currently unemployed are rather bleak. With
the labor force growing in the present decade at 3.4 percent per annum, the
average unemployment rate for the region could reach 22 percent by 2010.
L o wo u t p u tg r o w t hi so f t e nt h e“ p r o x i m a t e ”c a u s ef o rt h er i s ei nu n e m -
ployment. Following the oil bust in the late 1980s, the region experienced a
weak recovery in the 1990s due to the protracted pace of policy reforms. But
there are also structural reasons for unemployment that were not addressed
by policymakers in the past decade. MENA countries exhibit rigidities in
educational systems, wage setting, and regulatory regimes due to the domi-
nance of the public sector in labor markets. Although rates of human capital
accumulation have remained steady, MENA has reaped less than its poten-
tial in terms of economic growth and job creation. Government legislation on
hiring and ﬁring, minimum wages, and on collective bargaining agreements
as well as employment guarantees in the public sector have interfered with
the eﬃcient functioning of the labor market.2 In normal times, the impact of
1Youth unemployment ranges from 37 percent of total unemployment in Morocco to
73 percent in Syria, with a simple average of 53 percent for all countries for which data
are available. Except in Jordan and Lebanon, ﬁrst-time job seekers make up more than
50 percent of the unemployed (ILO 2003).
2See for instance Pissarides (1993) and Pritchett (1999). In countries where wage levels
fell in real terms during the 1990s, educated and experienced workers were aﬀected the
most, leading to a degradation of skills. Despite this, recent estimates suggest that returns
to education are generally higher in the public sector than in the private sector at nearly
all education levels but the university level (Assaad (2002) and World Bank (2004)).
3some of these structural rigidities may well be mitigated by the existence of
large informal sectors. However, in periods of signiﬁcant structural changes,
they could turn into binding constraints on the expansion of output and
employment. In such conditions, reforming the labor market becomes an
important element of any reform program aimed at stimulating growth and
promoting job creation.
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to oﬀer a quantitative analy-
sis of the impact of labor market reforms on growth, real wages, and un-
employment in labor-exporting MENA countries.3 W eb e g i ni nS e c t i o n2
with a brief overview of the main features of the labor market in ﬁve labor-
exporting MENA countries, namely, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and
Tunisia.4 Section 3 presents a quantitative framework that captures many
of these features (such as a large informal urban sector, active trade unions,
public sector employment, and international labor ﬂo w s ) ,a sw e l la so t h e r
important structural features of these countries, such as an unfunded pen-
sion system.5 Section 4 discusses the calibration procedure and parameter
values. Section V presents simulation experiments focusing on four types of
individual policy shocks: a reduction in payroll taxation on unskilled labor,
reductions in public sector wages and the size of the government workforce,
higher employment subsidies to the private sector, and a reduction in the
bargaining power of trade unions.
We also consider a “composite” reform package, involving a cut in pay-
roll taxes and public sector employment, as well as a reduction in unions’
bargaining strength. The extent to which high payroll taxes have tended to
discourage the demand for (unskilled) labor has been an important policy
issue in MENA countries in general. Our framework allows us to consider
the implications of both revenue- and budget-neutral changes in these taxes,
and the various channels through which they aﬀect job creation and unem-
3Our focus on LE-MENA countries only is due to the fact that the characteristics of
the labor market in these countries (as well as other structural economic features) diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from those of the labor-importing countries of the region.
4Y e m e ni sa l s oa ni m p o r t a n tl a b o r - e x p o r t ing country in MENA, but due to the lack of
reliable information on the labor market in that country we chose to exclude it from our
review.
5In principle, a rigorous analysis of pension systems and pension reform would require
the use of an intergenerational framework, such as the OLG-CGE model discussed by
Farmer and Wendner (1999), or more recently by Beetsma, Bettendorf, and Broer (2003),
Cavalletti and Lubke (2002) and Fehr, Hans, and Erling Ateigum (2002). Our analysis
should be viewed as an approximation only.
4ployment. The concluding section summarizes the results and draws together
the main policy lessons of the analysis. It emphasizes the need for an overall
package of reforms, involving not only labor market policies but also other
structural measures, to foster sustained growth in output and employment
in labor-exporting MENA countries.
2S o m e B a s i c F a c t s
The functioning of the labor market in MENA countries in general, and labor-
exporting countries in particular, has been reviewed in a number of recent
contributions.6 Here we brieﬂy review some of the salient features of this
market (as summarized in Figure 1), in order to motivate the speciﬁcation
of the model developed in the next section.
Fundamentally, the labor market in labor-exporting MENA countries can
be characterized as consisting of three segments: the rural sector, which con-
tinues to employ a sizable proportion of the labor force in many countries; the
informal urban sector, characterized mostly by self-employment and a limited
proportion of hired labor, a high degree of wage ﬂexibility, low employment
security, and no enforcement of labor regulations; and the formal (public
and private) urban sector, where workers are hired on the basis of explicit
contracts and the degree of compliance with labor regulation (particularly in
the public sector) is relatively high.
The informal sector accounts for a large fraction of the labor force. Es-
timates of informal employment range from a low of 42 percent of nonagri-
cultural employment in Syria to a high of 55 percent in Egypt. Although
moderate compared to other developing regions, these estimates are high
given the large share of public sector employment. In most labor-exporting
MENA countries, the public sector is the dominant employer in the formal
sector (see Abrahart, Kaur, and Tzannatos (2002)). When measured as a
percentage of nonagricultural employment, the public sector is the highest
among developing regions. Governments are often considered as “employers
of ﬁrst resort” especially for people with middle and higher education lev-
els. The perpetuation of employment guarantees in government hiring, and
6See Shaban et al. (2001) and World Bank (2004)). A more detailed discussion of
the features of the labor market in MENA countries is provided by Hollister and Gold-
stein (1994) and Salehi-Esfahani (2001). See also Agénor (1996, 2004) for a more general
discussion of the features of labor markets in developing countries.
5mismatched wage expectations resulting from generous public sector com-
pensation and beneﬁts policies, have contributed to the continued preference
for public sector jobs.
Although open unemployment has increased in recent years, underem-
ployment remains pervasive.7 Open and disguised unemployment (which af-
fects disproportionately the young and women) amount to anywhere between
25 and 60 percent of the labor force in some countries. A large majority of
the openly unemployed has secondary or post-secondary degrees but open
unemployment is also becoming more widespread among unskilled workers.
Part of this unemployment is “queueing” or “wait” unemployment, resulting
from public sector hiring and wage-setting practices, as shown for instance
by Assaad (1997) in the case of Egypt. The unemployed are essentially those
who would have had a chance at a formal job in the public sector in the past
and continue to have expectations of acquiring such a job. Those with no
education must either accept whatever employment is available to them, no
matter how casual, or create their own job in order to survive.
Labor market regulations, including restrictions on hiring and ﬁring, as
well as minimum wage legislation, are widespread in the region. In all labor-
exporting MENA countries (except Jordan) there is a minimum wage regu-
lation, although its impact on wage formation is not always clear.8 In Egypt
and Tunisia, compliance with minimum wages is mostly limited to the public
sector. In recent years, high unemployment in Morocco has led authorities
to allow the private sector to hire workers at wages below the minimum rate.
Restrictions on layoﬀs in the formal sector (and often generous severance
payments) make ﬁring redundant workers diﬃcult in most labor-exporting
MENA countries. In practice, however, the enforcement of the law is weak;
compliance with existing regulations is limited to the formal sector. Thus,
although labor market regulations may be pervasive on paper, their impact
is mitigated by weak enforcement and the existence of large informal sectors.
Wage determination often departs from market-clearing mechanisms as
7Published measures of unemployment mostly include unemployed workers looking for
jobs in the formal sector, but not underemployed workers in the informal and rural sectors,
that is, disguised unemployment. For the diﬃculty of measuring unemployment in MENA
countries, see for instance Rama (1998) for Tunisia.
8Said (2001) found no close correlation between minimum wages and unskilled wages in
Morocco; and during the 1980s, real wages for these workers fell faster than the real legal
minimum wage. However, other evidence, reviewed by Agénor and El Aynaoui (2003),
suggests the minimum wage is binding in urban areas.
6a result of legal restrictions, the existence of labor unions, and imperfectly
competitive wage-setting behavior by ﬁrms. Wages in agriculture and the
urban informal sectors tend to be highly ﬂexible. In contrast, some urban
formal sectors show rigid systems that are characterized by segmentation
and binding institutional constraints.9 In most countries, civil service pay
remains a point of reference for public enterprises and many large ﬁrms in the
formal private sector. This “leadership eﬀect” of public wage settlements is
a source of downward rigidity in wage behavior in the private sector. Among
non-wage labor costs, social security contributions (which are typically shared
between employers and employees) are particularly signiﬁcant. In Algeria,
contributions to the social security system alone constitute more than 36
percent of total labor costs.
With the exception of Jordan, where collective bargaining is practically
non-existent, labor unions in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia play a
signiﬁcant role in collective bargaining at the national level (see for instance
Assaad and Commander (1994) for Egypt). This occurs despite the fact that
actual unionization rates are relatively low in most of these countries (except
Egypt) and union membership tends to be primarily in the public sector.
The trade union movement is usually highly centralized, except in Morocco;
its inﬂuence on wage formation is often through the political process (by
lobbying to secure increases in minimum wages, for instance) rather than
through industrial action, such as strikes and other forms of work disruptions.
Through their inﬂuence on political parties, unionized workers are also able
to exert considerable pressure to maintain job security.
Finally, international migration ﬂows are an important source of foreign
exchange and income for all of these countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
peak years of oil-led growth in the region, the Gulf countries experienced
unprecedented labor force growth driven primarily by the large number of
immigrants seeking work from the labor-exporting MENA economies, es-
pecially Egypt and Jordan. During the same period, millions of migrants
9Labor market segmentation refers to a situation where observationally identical work-
ers (that is, workers with similar qualiﬁcations) receive diﬀerent wages depending on their
sector of employment. It is a pervasive feature of LE-MENA countries. Segmentation may
be induced by various factors: government intervention in the form of minimum wages;
trade unions, which may prevent wages from being equalized across sectors by imposing
a premium for their members; and eﬃciency wages, resulting from nutritional factors,
turnover costs or productivity considerations (see Agénor (1996, 2004)). The ﬁrst two
sources of segmentation are incorporated in the model presented in the next section.
7from Morocco, Tunisia, and (to a lesser extent) Algeria sought work in Eu-
rope. The 1990s witnessed a sharp fall in the outﬂows of workers from the
sending countries in the region even though remittances remained an impor-
tant source of income (see Figure 1). These ﬂows play a signiﬁcant role in
the adjustment of the domestic labor market, in ways that we discuss more
speciﬁcally below.
3 A Formal Framework
We now describe a quantitative framework to analyze the impact of labor
market reforms in labor-exporting MENA countries.10 The model captures
many of the structural features of the labor market highlighted in the fore-
going discussion. In this section, we brieﬂy summarize the main features of
the model (focusing on the production structure, the labor market, and the
pension system), with a complete list of equations provided in Appendix A,
and variable deﬁnitions in Appendix B.
3.1 Production
The composition of output and the structure of the labor market are sum-
marized in Figure 2. The basic distinction on the production side is that
between rural and urban sectors. The rural sector (or agriculture) produces
only one good, which is sold both on domestic markets and abroad. Urban
production includes both formal and informal components; in addition, the
formal urban economy is separated between production of a private good and
a public good. Land available for production in agriculture is in ﬁxed supply.
Gross output in the rural sector, as well as in all other sectors, is given by the
sum of value added and intermediate consumption (equation (A1)). Value
added is assumed to be produced with a Cobb-Douglas function of a com-
posite factor deﬁned as a function that depends on the number of unskilled
rural workers employed in agriculture and the economy-wide stock of public
physical capital (equation (A2)).The presence of public physical capital in
the production function of the agricultural good is based on the view that a
10The model is based on the Integrated Macroeconomic Model for Poverty Analysis
(IMMPA) framework developed by Agénor (2003), Agénor, Izquierdo and Fofack (2003),
and Agénor, Fernandes, and Haddad (2003), modiﬁed to account for international labor
migration (as in Agénor and El Aynaoui (2003)) and a social security system.
8greater availability of public physical capital in the economy (roads, storage
facilities, power grid, and the like) improves the productivity of large-scale
producers and other production units in agriculture, because it facilitates not
only trade and domestic commerce but also the production process itself. For
simplicity, the area of land allocated to production is normalized to unity.
Agricultural production exhibits decreasing returns to scale in the remaining
(composite) input.
Value added in the informal economy is given as a function of the num-
ber of unskilled workers employed there, with decreasing returns to scale
(equation (A4)). Value added in the public sector is generated by combining
skilled and unskilled labor using a CES function (equation (A5)). Employ-
ment levels of both categories of workers are treated as exogenous.
Private formal production uses as inputs skilled and unskilled labor, as
well as physical capital. Skilled labor and private physical capital have a
higher degree of complementarity (lower degree of substitution) than phys-
ical capital and unskilled workers. In order to account explicitly for these
diﬀerences in the degree of substitutability among inputs, we adopt a nested
production structure. At the lowest level, skilled labor and private capital
are combined to form a composite input with a low elasticity of substitution
between them (equation (A8)). At the second level, this composite input is
used together with unskilled labor to form a second composite input (equa-
tion (A7)). The elasticity of substitution between the ﬁrst composite input
and unskilled workers is taken to be higher than between skilled employment
and private capital. The ﬁnal layer combines the second composite input and
the stock of government capital as production inputs (equation (A6)).
3.2 The Labor Market
Unskilled workers in the economy may be employed either in the rural econ-
omy, UR, or in the urban economy, UU, whereas skilled workers are employed
only in the urban formal sector.
Agriculture and Internal Migration The demand for labor in the agri-
cultural sector, Ud























9where VA is value-added in the agricultural sector, WA denotes the nominal
wage, and PVA is the value added price (net of input costs) in the agricultural
sector.
Nominal wages in agriculture adjust to clear the labor market. Let Us
R











R grows at the exogenous population growth rate, gR,n e to f
worker migration to urban areas, MIG:
UR = UR,−1(1 + gR) − MIG. (3)
In the spirit of Harris and Todaro (1970), the incentives to migrate are
taken to depend negatively on the ratio of the average expected consumption
wage in rural areas to that prevailing in urban areas. Unskilled migrant
workers may be employed either in the private formal sector, in which case
they are paid a minimum wage, WM, or they can enter the informal economy
and receive the market-determined wage in that sector, WI. When rural
workers make the decision to migrate to urban areas, they are uncertain as
to which type of job they will be able to get, and therefore weigh wages
in each sector by the probability of ﬁnding a job in that sector. These
probabilities are approximated by prevailing employment ratios. Finally,
migrants consider what their expected purchasing power in rural and urban
areas will be, depending on whether they stay in the rural sector and consume
the “typical” basket of goods of rural households, or migrate and consume
the “typical” urban basket of goods.
The expected, unskilled urban real wage, EwU, is thus a weighted average
of the minimum wage in the formal sector and the going wage in the informal
sector, deﬂated by the urban consumption price index, PURB:
EwU =
θUWM,−1 +( 1− θU)WI,−1
PURB,−1
, (4)
where θU is the probability of ﬁnding a job in the urban formal sector, mea-
sured by the proportion of unskilled workers in the private formal sector,
relative to the total number of unskilled urban workers looking for a job
10in the urban formal sector, Us







In the rural sector, the employment probability is equal to unity, because
workers can always ﬁnd a job at the going wage. Assuming a one-period lag,





where PR is the rural consumption price index.












where 0 < λm < 1 measures the speed of adjustment and σM > 0 the elas-
ticity of migration ﬂows with respect to expected wages. This speciﬁcation
assumes that costs associated with migration or other frictions may delay
the migration process, introducing persistence in migration ﬂows.
The Urban Sector The public sector employs an exogenous number of
unskilled workers, UG, at the nominal wage rate WUG, whereas the demand
for unskilled labor by the formal private sector is determined by ﬁrms’ proﬁt
maximization subject to the given minimum wage, WM. Both wages are
assumed to be fully indexed on the urban formal price index, PF:
WUG = ωUGPF,W M = ωMPF, (7)
where ωM and ωUG measure exogenous real wages.
Labor demand by the formal private sector is determined by ﬁrms’ proﬁt
maximization. We assume also that ﬁrms pay a payroll tax, at the rate
0 <p t a x U < 1 on unskilled labor. This tax is proportional to the wage bill,
WMUP. Firms also receive a nominal employment subsidy on unskilled labor
11Note that the speciﬁcation of θU assumes complete job turnover outside the govern-
ment sector every period.














where σXP1 =1 /(1 + ρXP1) measures the elasticity of substitution between
unskilled labor and the composite input.
We assume, as in Agénor (2002), that mobility of the unskilled labor force
between the formal and informal sectors is imperfect as a result of relocation
and congestion costs. Migration ﬂows are determined by expected income
opportunities, again in line with Harris and Todaro (1970). Speciﬁcally, the
supply of unskilled workers in the formal sector (including public sector work-
ers), Us
F, is assumed to change over time as a function of the expected wage
diﬀerential across sectors, measured in real terms. Wage and employment
prospects are formed on the basis of prevailing conditions in the labor mar-
ket. Because there is no job turnover in the public sector (as noted earlier),
the expected nominal wage in the formal economy is equal to the minimum
wage weighted by the probability of being hired in the private sector. Assum-
ing that hiring in that sector is random, this probability can be approximated
by the ratio between employed workers and those seeking employment during
t h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d ,Ud
P,−1/(Us
F,−1 − UG,−1). The expected nominal wage in
the informal economy, WI, is simply the going wage, because there are no
barriers to entry in that sector. Assuming a one-period lag, the supply of
















, βF > 0, (9)
where βF is the elasticity of formal sector labor supply growth with respect
to expected wages. The rate of unskilled unemployment in the formal sector,







From (A4), the demand for labor in the informal sector can be derived as
U
d
I = βXI(VI/wI), (11)
12where VI is value added in the informal sector and wI the product wage,
given by wI = WI/PVI,w i t hPVI denoting the price of value added in the
informal sector.
The supply of labor in the informal economy, Us
I, is obtained by sub-
tracting the unskilled labor supply in the formal sector, Us
F, from the urban
unskilled labor force, UU:
U
s
I = UU − U
s
F. (12)
The informal labor market clears continuously, so that Ud
I = Us
I.F r o m






The urban unskilled labor supply, UU, grows as a result of “natural”
urban population growth and migration of unskilled labor from the rural
economy, as discussed earlier. In addition, a quantity SKL of urban un-
skilled workers acquires skills and leaves the unskilled labor force to augment
the supply of skilled workers in the economy. We make the additional as-
sumption that individuals are born unskilled, and therefore natural urban
population growth (not resulting from migration or skills acquisition factors)
is represented by urban unskilled population growth only, at the exogenous
(gross) rate gU. Finally, there are international migrations, the ﬂow of which
is measured by IMIG, and retirement from the urban labor force, measured
by δ
U
NPUU, which is deﬁned below. Thus, the urban unskilled labor supply
evolves according to
UU =( 1+gU − δ
U




As noted earlier, the employment levels of both skilled and unskilled
workers in the public sector are taken as exogenous. Given that some workers
retire in every period, we have
UG =( 1+gUG− δ
U
NP)UG,−1,
where gUG > 0 is the exogenous growth rate of the unskilled labor force in
the public sector.
The nominal wage that skilled workers in the public sector earn, WSG,i s
also indexed on the urban formal consumption price index:
13WSG = ωSGPF, (15)
where ωSG is an exogenous real wage.
To determine wages and employment for skilled labor in the private formal
sector, we use the “right to manage” approach, in which ﬁrms bargain with
t r a d eu n i o n so v e rt h en o m i n a lw a g e ,WS, and set unilaterally the level of
employment. In addition, we assume that private urban ﬁrms pay a payroll
tax on the skilled labor wage bill, at the rate 0 <p t a x S < 1, and receive a
nominal employment subsidy of ESS <W S per skilled worker. The demand
for skilled labor, Sd














Following Booth (1995, pp. 124-26) and Layard, Nickell, and Jackman
(1991, pp. 100-3), WS is determined as follows. Assume that all private
sector ﬁrms are unionized, or equivalently that all workers belong to a sin-
gle (representative) union. Let ΩS denote the union’s reservation wage and
PROFP ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Under the Nash bargaining approach, the bargained







where ν is a measure of the trade union’s bargaining power. The bargained
















because ∂PROFP/∂WS = −Sd
P by the envelope theorem (each ﬁrm will
choose employment ex post such that WS is equal to the marginal value












P) is the wage elasticity of the demand
for skilled labor. The term on the left-hand side of this expression measures
the proportional marginal beneﬁt to the bargain from the proportional in-
crease in the skilled wage. The beneﬁt associated with a wage increase incurs
14only to the union, so it is weighted by the union’s bargaining power, ν.T h e
ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the union’s proportional marginal cost
(the percentage reduction in employment due to the proportional increase in
the wage) weighted by the union’s bargaining power. The second term on
the right-hand side represents the ﬁrm’s proportional marginal cost. Con-
dition (18) indicates therefore that the bargained wage is set such that the
proportional marginal beneﬁts to both parties from a unit increase in wages
is exactly equal to the proportional marginal cost to each party.
The union’s reservation wage, ΩS, is assumed to be related positively
to skilled wages in the public sector, WSG, and negatively to the skilled
unemployment rate, UNEMPS. Wage setting in the public sector is assumed
to play a signaling role to wage setters in the rest of the economy. When
unemployment is high, the probability of ﬁnding a job (at any given wage)
is low. Consequently, the higher the unemployment rate, the greater the
incentive for the union to moderate its wage demands and boost employment.













where Ω0,φ1,φ2 > 0,a n dUNEMPS is deﬁned below. Using the implicit
function theorem, it can be established that lower unemployment, higher
public sector wages, or an increase in the bargaining strength of the union,
raise the level of wages in the private sector.
Given that ﬁrms are on their labor demand curve, open skilled unemploy-
ment may emerge. The rate of skilled unemployment, denoted UNEMPS,
is given by the ratio of skilled workers who are not employed either by the









G is the total number of skilled workers in the public sector, engaged








G g r o w so v e rt i m ea c c o r d i n gt o
S
T





15where gSG > 0 is the exogenous growth rate of the skilled labor force in the
public sector.
We assume that skilled workers who are unable to ﬁnd a job in the formal
economy opt to remain openly unemployed, instead of entering the informal
sector (in contrast to unskilled workers), perhaps because of adverse signaling
eﬀects, as discussed by Agénor (2003).
The evolution of the skilled labor force depends on the rate at which
unskilled workers acquire skills:
S =( 1− δS − δ
S
NP)S−1 + SKL, (22)
where 0 < δS < 1 is the rate of “depreciation” or “de-skilling” of the skilled
labor force.
Skills Acquisition The acquisition of skills by unskilled workers takes
place through a free education system operated by the public sector. Specif-
ically, the ﬂow of unskilled workers who become skilled, SKL,i st a k e nt o
be a CES function of the “eﬀective” number of teachers in the public sector,
SE








where ϕ measures the productivity of public workers engaged in providing
education. ϕ is assumed to depend on the relative wage of skilled workers in
the public sector, WSG, relative to the expected wage for that same category
of labor in the private sector, which (in the absence of unemployment bene-
ﬁts) is given by one minus the unemployment rate, 1−UNEMPS, times the







, δE > 0, (24)
where 0 < ϕm < 1 denotes the “minimum” level of eﬀort.12
12Note that we do not explain endogenously the allocation of unskilled workers’ time
between production and learning–an important trade-oﬀ from the individual’s point of
view. Allocating more time to learning reduces the individual’s current labor income, but
enhances his (or her) human capital, thereby increasing its earnings in the future. To the
extent that public capital in education enters as an input to the human capital production
16International Labor Migration As noted earlier, international migra-
tion is an important feature of the labor market in labor-exporting MENA
countries. We assume here that migration involves only unskilled workers,
and that potential migrants are in the urban sector (as captured in (14)).
Moreover, international migration ﬂo w sa r et a k e nt ob ed e t e r m i n e db yt w o
factors: the expected urban real wage for unskilled labor, EwU, given by (4),
relative to the expected foreign wage measured in terms of the urban formal





with WFOR denoting the foreign wage measured in foreign-currency terms,
assumed exogenous, and ER is the exchange rate. Adopting a speciﬁcation












where 0 < λim < 1 measures the speed of adjustment, and σIM > 0 the
elasticity of migration ﬂows with respect to expected wages. Again, costs as-
sociated with migration (such as relocation costs) are assumed to introduce
some degree of persistence. Remittances associated with international mi-
gration ﬂows of unskilled labor are assumed to beneﬁt unskilled households
in the urban formal and informal sectors.13
3.3 The Pay-as-you-go Pension System
We assume that there is a pay-as-you-go pension system, whose current out-
lays to pensioners (retired workers in the urban formal sector, both public
and private), denoted PENSIONS,a r eﬁnanced by payroll taxes on workers
function, as in (23), it would also aﬀect private decisions to accumulate human capital.
See for instance Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) for a formal model of the labor-learning
choice, which emphasizes, however, ﬂow spending on education.
13See Glystos (2002, 2003) for a discussion of the macroeconomic eﬀects of foreign
remittances in several MENA countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.





P + TRSOC. (26)
Total pension outlays are given by the product of an average beneﬁt,
BENEF, which is fully indexed (with a one-period lag) on the price index
for the urban formal sector, PF:
BENEF = BENEF−1(1 + ∆lnPF,−1). (27)
The number of pensioners at the current period, NUMPEN, consists of
last period’s “stock” (adjusted for a ﬁxed mortality rate), plus the ﬂow of
skilled and unskilled workers retiring in each period, NEWPEN:
NUMPEN =( 1− δN)NUMPEN−1 + NEWPEN,
where δN i st h ep r o p o r t i o no fp e n s i o n e r sw h od i ei ne a c hp e r i o d .T h en u m b e r

















NP) of employed unskilled (respectively skilled) work-
ers retire from the formal sector labor force.
Thus, total pension outlays are given by
PENSIONS = BENEF · NUMPEN. (28)
If we assume that the pension fund cannot borrow directly from the pub-
lic, and that its accounts must be balanced, government transfers are deter-
mined from (26), given (28):





Alternatively, if government transfers are considered ﬁxed, the budget








14Note that, in our model, only employers pay payroll taxes that serve to ﬁnance the
pension system. In practice, workers also make signiﬁcant contributions. However, we
abstract from these contributions, given that the focus of our simulation experiments is
on changes in payroll taxes paid by ﬁrms.
183.4 Other Model Features
Components of supply and demand are described by equations (A37) to
(A48). Both the informal and public sector goods are nontraded. Total
supply in each sector is thus equal to gross production (equations (A39) and
(A40)). Agricultural and private formal urban goods, by contrast, compete
with imported goods. The supply of the composite good for each of these
sectors consists of a combination of imports and domestically produced goods
(equations (A38) and (A41)).
For the agricultural and informal sectors, aggregate demand consists of
intermediate consumption and demand for ﬁnal consumption (by both the
government and the private sector), whereas aggregate demand for the public
and private goods consists not only of intermediate consumption and ﬁnal
consumption but also of investment demand (equations (A42), (A43), (A44),
and (A45)). Total demand for intermediate consumption of any good is the
sum of intermediate consumption of this good over all production sectors
(equation (A37)). Government expenditure on any good (except informal
good) is equal to a ﬁxed share of total government expenditure (equation
(A47)). Household consumption of each good is the summation across all
categories of households’ consumption of this good (equation (A46)). Con-
sumption by individual households is derived from a Linear Expenditures
System (LES). Total private investment by private urban ﬁrms consists of
purchases of both public and urban formal private goods and services (equa-
tion (A48)).
Regarding external trade, private ﬁrms in the urban formal sector allocate
their output to exports or the domestic market according to a production
possibility frontier/transformation function (equation (A9)). Allocation of
agricultural output to domestic consumption and exports occurs according
to a production possibility frontier (equation (A3)). Proﬁt maximization re-
quires ﬁrms to equate relative prices to the opportunity cost in production
(equation (A49). Imports compete with domestic goods in the agricultural
sector as well as in the private formal sector (equations (A38) and (A41)).
Cost minimization requires the demand for imported vs. domestic agricul-
tural and private urban goods to be a function of relative domestic and
import prices (equation (A50)).
Prices are deﬁned in equations (A51) to (A62). The value added price
of output is given by the gross price net of indirect taxes, less the cost of
intermediate inputs (equation (A51)). The world prices of imported and
19exported goods are taken to be exogenously given. The domestic currency
price of these goods is obtained by adjusting the world price by the exchange
rate, with import prices also adjusted by the tariﬀ rate (equations (A52) and
(A53)). Because the transformation function between exports and domestic
sales of the agricultural and urban private goods is linear homogeneous, the
domestic sales prices are derived from the sum of export and domestic expen-
diture on agricultural and private goods divided by the quantity produced
of these goods (equation (A54)). For the informal and public sectors, the
composite price is equal to the domestic market price, which is in turn equal
to the output price (equation (A56)). For the agricultural and private urban
production sectors, the substitution function between imports and domes-
tic goods is also linearly homogeneous, and the composite market price is
determined accordingly by the expenditure identity (equation (A55)). The
nested production function of private formal urban goods is also linearly
homogeneous; prices of the composite inputs are derived in similar fashion
(equations (A60) and (A61)). The price of capital is constructed by using
the investment expenditure identity, which involves public and private-formal
urban goods (equation (A62)). Finally, the consumption price indices for the
rural, urban, and urban formal are given as weigted averages of composite
good prices, with weights reﬂecting consumption patterns (equations (A57),
(A58), and (A59)).
Proﬁts and income are deﬁned in (A63) to (A70). Firms’ proﬁts in the in-
formal and agricultural sectors are deﬁned as revenue minus total labor costs
(equation (A63)). Proﬁts of private-urban sector ﬁrms account for salaries
paid to both skilled and unskilled workers (equation (A64)). Firms’ income
in the agricultural and the informal sector is equal to their proﬁts (equation
(A65)). But ﬁrms’ income in the formal urban economy is equal to their
proﬁts minus corporate taxes and interest payments on foreign loans (equa-
tion (A66)). Household income is based on the return to labor (salaries),
distributed proﬁts, and transfers. Households are deﬁned according to their
sector of occupation. There are four categories of households: rural, urban
informal, urban formal, and capitalists. The rural household comprises all
rural workers; the urban informal household consists of workers in the urban
informal sector; and the urban formal household consists of urban formal
sector employees (skilled and unskilled). Finally, there is a capitalist-rentier
household, whose income comes from ﬁrms’ earnings in the formal private
sector. Households in the rural and informal urban economy own the ﬁrms
in which they are employed–an assumption that captures the fact that ﬁrms
20in these sectors tend to be small, family-owned enterprises. Income of rural
households is equal to the sum of value added from production and transfers
from the government (equation (A67)). Income of urban informal households
also includes a fraction of foreign remittances from (unskilled) workers em-
ployed abroad (equation (A68)). Income of urban formal households depends
on government transfers and salaries, foreign remittances, and pension pay-
ments (equation (A69)). Firms provide no source of income, because these
groups do not own the production units in which they are employed. Firms
in the private urban sector retain a portion of their after-tax earnings for in-
vestment ﬁnancing purposes and transfer the remainder to capitalists. Thus,
the capitalist-rentier household’s income is the sum of transfer payments and
distributed proﬁts (equation (A70)).
Consumption, savings, and investment are described in equations (A71)
to (A74). Each category of household saves a constant fraction of its dis-
posable income, which is equal to total income minus income tax payments
(equation (A71)). The portion of disposable income that is not saved is al-
located to consumption (equation (A72)). The accumulation of capital over
time depends on the ﬂow level of investment and the depreciation rate of
capital from the previous period (equation (A74)). The aggregate identity
between savings and investment implies that total investment must be equal
to total savings, which is itself equal to ﬁrms’ after-tax retained earnings, to-
tal after-tax household savings, government savings, and foreign borrowing
by ﬁrms and the government (equation (A73)). In the simulations reported
later, this equation is solved residually for the level of private investment,
which implies therefore that the model is “savings driven”.
The government side is described in equations (A75) to (A80). Gov-
ernment expenditures consist of government consumption, which only has
demand-side eﬀects, and public investment, which has both demand- and
supply-side eﬀects. Public investment consists of investment in infrastruc-
ture, education, and health. We deﬁne investment in infrastructure as the
expenditure aﬀecting the accumulation of public infrastructure capital, which
includes (as noted earlier) public assets such as roads, power plants and rail-
roads. Investment in education aﬀects the stock of public education capital,
which consists of assets such as school buildings and other infrastructure
determining skills acquisition, but does not represent human capital. In a
similar fashion, investment in health adds to the stock of public assets such
as hospitals, health clinics, and other government infrastructure aﬀecting
h e a l t h .A l lv a l u ea d d e di nt h ep r o d u c t i o no fp u b l i cg o o d si sd i s t r i b u t e da s
21wages. Thus, the current ﬁscal deﬁcit is equal to tax revenue minus current
household transfers, pension transfers, current expenditure on goods and ser-
vices, wage expenditure, and interest payments on foreign public loans (equa-
tion (A75)). Net government saving is equal to minus the overall government
budget deﬁcit and is obtained by adding public investment expenditure to the
current ﬁscal deﬁcit (equation (A76)). Total tax revenues consist of revenue
generated by import tariﬀs, sales taxes, income taxes (on both households
and ﬁrms in the urban private sector), and payroll taxes net of employment
subsidies (equation (A77)). Government investment is the sum of investment
in infrastructure, investment in health, and investment in education, which
are all considered exogenous policy variables (equation (A78)). Government
investment increases the stock of public capital in either infrastructure, ed-
ucation or health. Accumulation of each type of capital is equal to the sum
of the capital stock from the previous period and current-period investment
minus depreciation of the capital stock from the previous period (equation
(A79)). Because we assume that only the private urban good is used for cap-
ital accumulation, we deﬂate nominal investment by the demand price for
private goods to obtain real investment. Infrastructure and health capital
aﬀect the production process in the private sector as they both combine to
produce the stock of government capital (equation (A80)).
F i n a l l y ,t h eb a l a n c eo fp a y m e n t si sd e ﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n s( A 8 6 )t o( A 8 8 ) .
The external constraint implies that any current account surplus (or deﬁcit)
must be compensated by a net ﬂow of foreign capital, given by the sum of
changes in foreign loans made to the government and to private ﬁrms (equa-
tion (A86)). The ﬂow of remittances is equal to the foreign wage measured
in foreign-currency terms times the stock of domestic workers abroad (equa-
tion (A87)). In turn, the stock of domestic workers abroad is the sum of
new immigrants and the stock of domestic workers abroad from the previous
period, minus attrition (equation (A88)).
4 Calibration and Parameter Values
This section presents a brief overview of the characteristics of the data un-
derlying the model’s social accounting matrix (SAM) and discusses the pa-
rameter values.
224.1 The Social Accounting Matrix
The basic dataset consists of a SAM and a set of initial levels and lagged
variables. The SAM encompasses 37 accounts including production and re-
tail sectors (8 accounts), educational services (2 accounts), labor production
factors and proﬁts (5 accounts), enterprises (1 account), households (4 ac-
counts), government current expenditures, taxes and pensions (12 accounts),
government investment expenditures (3 accounts), private investment expen-
ditures (1 account), and the rest of the world (1 account).
The SAM dataset was derived so as to (i) reﬂect characteristics of a typi-
cal labor-exporting MENA country, and (ii) represent an equilibrium dataset,
including a balanced government budget, a zero balance of payments (BoP),
and zero net foreign borrowing. Nevertheless, the net factor service account
of the BoP includes private and foreign interest payments reﬂecting past for-
eign borrowing. The characteristics of the SAM data can be summarized
as follows. On the output side, agriculture and the informal sector account
for respectively 12 and 35 percent of total output at producer prices. In
contrast, private urban formal production accounts for almost 46 percent of
total output. On the demand side, private current expenditures account for
64 percent of GDP, whereas government current expenditures and wages ac-
count for 11 percent of GDP. At the same time, total investment expenditures
represent 22 percent of GDP, implying that our “prototype” labor-exporting
MENA country is running a trade surplus equivalent to 2.8 percent of GDP.
Looking at the BoP, total net remittances to households amount to 1.2
percent of GDP. Together with the trade balance surplus, this is ﬁnancing a
deﬁcit on the net factor services account amounting to 4 percent of GDP. This
includes private foreign interest payments (-1.5 percent of GDP) and govern-
ment foreign interest payments (-2.5 percent of GDP). The trade balance is
dominated by non-agricultural imports and exports, with agricultural exports
accounting for only 8 percent of total export earnings, and non-agricultural
imports accounting for 92 percent of total import expenditures. The level of
t r a d eo p e n n e s s ,m e a s u r e db yt h er a t i oo ft h es u mo fi m p o r t sa n de x p o r t st o
GDP, amounts to a moderate 38 percent.
Looking at the government budget, indirect taxes in the form of produc-
tion and retail level taxes (excluding payroll taxes) account for 84 percent of
total government revenues. Household tax revenues, amounting to 13 percent
of total government income, represents the largest revenue item among direct
tax items, whereas enterprise taxes account for only 4 percent of revenues.
23On the expenditure side, domestic transfers and foreign interest payments ac-
count for respectively 24 and 9 percent of the budget, whereas consumption
and savings for investment purposes amount to respectively 40 and 27 per-
cent of the budget. Overall, the government relies heavily on indirect taxes
for revenue collection (as is common in developing countries), while at at the
same time allocating a signiﬁcant fraction of its resources to investment.
4.2 Behavioral Parameters
Consider now the behavioral parameters of the model. In agriculture the
Cobb-Douglas (share) parameter in the production of value added equals
0.8, whereas the CES substitution elasticity between rural labor and pub-
lic capital equals 2/3. Public capital is aggregated from infrastructure and
health capital using a substitution elasticity of 1/2. The informal sector only
has one factor of production, unskilled labor, and the Cobb-Douglas (share)
parameter equals also 0.8. In contrast, the private formal sector has a three-
level nested production structure, with a bottom level substitution elasticity
of 2/3 between private capital and skilled labor, a middle level substitution
elasticity of 7/6 between the bottom level composite factor and unskilled
labor, and a top level substitution elasticity of 5/6 between the middle level
composite factor and public capital. Finally, public sector value added is de-
rived using CES aggregation of skilled and unskilled labor with a substitution
elasticity of unity.
Turning to the factor market and the wage bargaining equation for private
sector skilled wages, elasticities with respect to skilled labor unemployment
and public sector wages are set respectively at -2.0 and 2.0, whereas the wage
elasticity of private skilled labor demand is -1.0. The parameter measuring
the trade union’s bargaining power is set at 0.7. Rural-urban and interna-
tional migration elasticities with respect to relative expected wages are set
respectively at 0.4 and 0.6, whereas persistence parameters for rural-urban
and international migration are set respectively at 0.1 and 0.3. The formal-
informal sector migration elasticity with respect to relative expected wages
is 0.4. the elasticity of substitution between publicly-employed teachers and
public education capital in the skills-upgrading CES production function is
1/3, whereas the elasticity of teachers eﬀort with respect to relative wages is
0.8.
The Armington elasticities for rural agricultural and urban formal sector
goods imports are set respectively at 2/3 and 1.5. Similarly, the CET trans-
24formation elasticities for rural agricultural and urban formal sector goods
exports are set respectively at 2/3 and 1.5. Finally, household minimum
consumption levels amount to 10 percent of initial consumption levels.
5 Simulation Experiments
In what follows we use the framework described above to analyze ﬁve types
of labor market reforms: a reduction in payroll taxes on unskilled labor, as-
suming both neutral and non-neutral changes on the budget; reductions in
public sector employment and wages; an active labor market policy consist-
ing of higher employment subsidies to unskilled workers in the formal private
sector; and a reduction in trade unions’ bargaining strength.15 We also con-
sider a composite reform package, which consists of a cut in payroll taxes
and public sector employment, as well as a reduction in unions’ bargaining
power. In all of these experiments we use a savings-driven closure rule, and
solve residually for private investment demand, using the aggregate savings-
investment balance (equation (A73)). This allows us to study the “crowding
in” and “crowding out” eﬀects of labor market policies, through their impact
on the government budget balance.
5.1 Reduction in Payroll Taxes on Unskilled Labor
The eﬀects of a permanent, 5 percentage-point reduction in the payroll tax
rate on unskilled labor are illustrated in Figure 3. In analyzing the impact of
this policy measure on growth and employment, a key aspect involves eval-
uating its ﬁscal implications. For instance, assuming that the policy change
must be neutral with respect to the budget deﬁcit, what are the alternative
options for oﬀsetting the eﬀect of a reduction in payroll taxation? To illus-
t r a t et h i st y p eo fi n t e r a c t i o n sb e t w e e nl a b o rm a r k e tr e f o r m sa n dﬁscal policy,
we examine three alternative “closure” rules on the ﬁscal side. In the ﬁrst,
there is no oﬀsetting change in revenue, and the government borrows domes-
tically to balance its budget–implying therefore full crowding out of private
investment, as implied by the aggregate savings-investment balance (equa-
tion (A73)). In the second, the policy is budget-neutral, and the government
raises sales taxes on the private, formal sector good to oﬀset the increase
15Results of all these experiements are summarized in Figures 3 to 9. A set of Excel
sheets, containing more detailed results, are available upon request.
25in additional expenditures on transfers to the pension system. In the third,
the policy is also budget-neutral, and the government oﬀsets the reduction
in payroll taxes by an increase in income taxes on capitalists and rentiers.16
In all three cases, we assume that the accounts of the pension system are
balanced through government transfers, as indicated in (29). Of course, even
if the policy is budget-neutral in the sense described here, private capital
formation may still be crowded out, as a result of general equilibrium eﬀects
leading to, say, smaller private savings relative to the baseline.
A number of results are common to all three payroll tax experiments.
Reduced labor costs leads to increased employment of unskilled labor, as well
as substitution away from skilled labor (and physical capital) in the private
formal sector. A decrease in skilled labor wages–resulting from the rise in
skilled unemployment, itself due to the reduction in the demand for that
category of labor–partly oﬀsets the initial tax-induced 5 percent increase in
the diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled labor costs. The net increase in
the labor cost diﬀerential amounts to around 3.8 percent in the longer term,
implying a strong substitution away from skilled labor toward unskilled labor
even in the long run.
The increase in unskilled employment is drawn partly from the pool of
unemployed workers in the formal sector and partly from increasing migra-
tion from the informal sector. Increasing migration to the formal sector
occurs against the backdrop of strongly increasing informal sector wages.
The minimum wage increases over time as a result of full indexation on ur-
ban consumption prices, and higher demand for unskilled labor in the formal
sector leads to a rise in the expected formal sector wage. Over time, the en-
suing increase in the expected formal-informal sector wage diﬀerential leads
to higher migration ﬂows to the formal economy. This pushes the informal
sector wage upwards. Employment in the informal sector also increases in the
short run but tapers oﬀ in the medium to long term. The initial combination
of reduced overseas and formal sector migration ﬂows a year after the shock
and beyond increases informal sector labor supply by 0.3-0.4 percent. How-
ever, although reduced migration overseas, due to increased domestic urban
wages, continues to add workers to the informal sector labor force, the sub-
sequent reversal of formal sector migration coupled with migration outﬂows
to the rural sector, leads to a gradual reversal of the initial increase in labor
16Of course, other oﬀsetting changes, such as increases in direct tax rates on enterprises,
or an increase in indirect taxes on urban goods, could also be considered.
26supply. The reduced supply of labor is matched by a reduction in demand
due to the high informal sector wages. The mirror image of reduced informal
sector employment is a gradual increase in rural employment. Accordingly,
the cumulative eﬀect of medium-term outward migration to rural areas, due
to increasing agricultural wages, leads to a relatively strong expansion of
labor supply in the rural sector.
At the aggregate level, the reduction in payroll taxes leads to a strong
initial increase followed by a gradual decline in nominal GDP. In contrast,
real GDP increases over time, indicating that the declining growth path for
nominal GDP is a purely nominal phenomenon. The adjustment process
involves a real exchange rate depreciation, which gradually raises exports
and lowers imports in the long term. The increasing trade surplus is used
to ﬁnance the net factor service income deﬁcit, which rises due to declining
migration overseas.
Whereas the growth paths of GDP and trade aggregates are relatively sim-
ilar across payroll tax experiments, the growth paths of private consumption
and investment are relatively sensitive–as could be expected–to whether
or not there are oﬀsetting changes in taxes. The growth paths of private
consumption and investment are diverging strongly in the experiment with a
non-neutral budget closure. The ensuing budget deﬁcit is ﬁnanced through
domestic borrowing, leading to crowding out of private investment and higher
disposable household income, which translates into increased private con-
sumption.
The strong crowding-out eﬀect disappears when sales or income taxes are
raised to pay for increased transfers to the pension system. However, diﬀer-
ences persist. Sales taxes on formal sector goods raise the price of investment
goods and intermediate inputs, which depresses (everything else equal) prof-
its, savings, and private capital accumulation. In contrast, an increase in
the tax rate on capitalists’ income reduces household disposable income and
private consumption, but allows for increased investment in the long term.
Thus, the scenario where reduced payroll tax revenues and increased trans-
fers to the pension system are oﬀset by increased household income taxes
results in the highest long-term GDP growth rates.17 Growth in the formal
17Note that the model does not capture the disincentive eﬀects of higher direct tax rates
on labor supply (or participation rates). To the extent that these eﬀects are large, the
impact of higher output growth rates on unemployment would be ambiguous. The reason
is that a reduction in labor supply (which would tend to lower unemployment) could be
oﬀset by large substitution eﬀects toward physical capital.
27sector due to increased private capital accumulation is responsible for higher
long-term aggregate growth in the latter scenario.
The impact on the government budget is of course related to the budget
closure rule. Government transfers to the pension system will, in each case,
increase by around 0.2 percent of GDP in the long run, due to the decline in
own-ﬁnancing, itself resulting from the reduction in payroll taxation. With-
out the introduction of alternative ﬁnancing sources, this leads to a domestic
borrowing requirement of 0.3 percent of GDP in the long term. In contrast,
domestic borrowing is completely avoided in the long term, if budget-neutral
speciﬁcations with variable sales and/or income taxes are applied. Look-
ing at the pension system, total pension payments increases the most when
higher government transfers are ﬁnanced by increased sales taxes on formal
sector goods. The number of workers who qualify to enter the pension sys-
tem rises (due to the expansion of formal sector employment) by around 0.5
percent in the long run, regardless of the budget closure. However, whereas
the average beneﬁt rate decreases by 0.4 percent when increased government
transfers are a) ﬁnanced by higher income taxes, or b)n o tﬁnanced by tax
increases, it only falls by 0.1 percent when higher formal sector sales taxes
lead to increases in prices of formal sector goods.
5.2 Cut in Public Sector Wages
We now examine the eﬀects of wage reductions for both unskilled public
workers and skilled public employees (excluding teachers). Results of a per-
m a n e n t ,5p e r c e n tr e d u c t i o ni nt h ew a g er a t ef o re a c hl a b o rc a t e g o r ya r e
summarized in Figures 4 and 5.
The reduction in public sector wages leads, in both cases, to a reduc-
tion in the public sector borrowing requirement and to crowding-in of pri-
vate investment. A reduction in unskilled wages in the public sector, by
contrast, has little impact on growth in the long term. The main channel
through which public sector wage reductions is transmitted is a reduction
in aggregate demand, induced by lower government consumption expendi-
tures, and an increase in total domestic savings (due to a reduction in the
budget deﬁcit only, because private savings fall concomitantly with income),
and thus private investment. With employment in the public sector ﬁxed,
the expansion in investment demand leads to increased private sector em-
ployment of unskilled labor and a reduction in the unemployment rate. In
turn, the reduction in unemployment (which raises the probability of ﬁnd-
28ing a job in the private formal economy) leads to strong migration into the
formal sector. The increased employment and formal sector migration levels
are, however, immediately reversed. The combination of declining demand
for formal sector goods and increasing accumulation of capital lowers the
demand for unskilled labor over time. Moreover, increasing informal sector
wages and formal sector unemployment leads to outward migration from the
formal sector. In the long term, employment levels are unchanged in every
sector, and the higher level of production (in the formal sector) is entirely
driven by increased private capital accumulation. Migration ﬂows reverse
themselves and unemployment rates remain unchanged at baserun levels.
Looking at the pension system, overall pensions, including transfers from the
government, remain unchanged. Accordingly, both the number of pensioners
and the level of pension beneﬁts are unchanged in the long term.
In contrast, a cut in skilled wages in the public sector has a relatively
strong long-term impact on growth because of the leadership eﬀect on pri-
vate skilled wages. Reduced public sector wages spills over into lower private
skilled wages and higher employment of that category of labor in the private
sector. Combined with the cumulative eﬀect of increased private investment,
this leads to higher growth rates in the formal sector. At the same time,
growth in the rural and urban informal sectors is driven by declining mi-
gration into the urban (formal) sector. The outward migration is driven by
substitution of skilled for unskilled labor in private formal sector production,
which leads to a declining formal-informal sector wage diﬀerential. In ad-
dition, an increase in the expected urban wage, due to increasing informal
sector wages and a gradually declining unskilled unemployment rate, leads
to a decline in international migration ﬂows. The combination of declining
international and formal sector migration leads to increasing labor supply in
the urban informal sector, and, because of increasing rural wages, to further
out-migration and higher labor supply in the rural sector.
Interestingly, a cut in public sector skilled wages leads to a long-term re-
duction in both skilled and unskilled formal sector unemployment rates. The
reduction in unemployment among skilled workers results from increased for-
mal sector employment. In contrast, the reduction in open unemployment
among unskilled workers follows mainly from outward migration to the in-
formal sector.
Looking at the current account, reduced international migration (result-
ing from the increase in the expected urban wage) leads to an increase in the
net factor service account deﬁcit. This is counterbalanced by an improvement
29in the trade balance, which comes about as a result of a small depreciation
of the real exchange rate.
The pension system sees some minor changes in the long term, including
a small increase in the number of retirees and a small decrease in the average
pension beneﬁt rate. The number of pensioners increases due to increased
formal sector employment levels, while pension beneﬁts decline because the
strong supply response in the formal sector reduces formal sector prices.
The overall eﬀect is to leave overall pension payments, including government
transfers to the pension system, unchanged in the long run. The main impact
on the government budget is therefore to reduce the budget deﬁcit through
reduced consumption.
5.3 Public Sector Layoﬀs
The experiments of this section include public sector layoﬀs of both unskilled
workers and skilled public employees (excluding teachers). Results of a per-
manent, 5 percent reduction in the number of workers in each labor category
are summarized in Figures 6 and 7.
R e d u c i n gt h es i z eo fp u b l i cs e c t o re m p l o y m e n th a st h et w i ne ﬀects of
increasing private capital accumulation and raising levels of employment in
the private sector. Crowding-in of private investment is achieved because
non-budget neutral layoﬀst u r ni n t oas m a l l e rd o m e s t i cg o v e r n m e n tb o r r o w -
ing requirement. The increased private capital accumulation has a positive
supply-side eﬀect on formal sector output. Nevertheless, the net increase in
relative demand for formal sector goods (resulting from higher private in-
vestment and lower private consumption), means that private formal sector
employment levels also increases for both categories of workers.
Aggregate growth eﬀects are absent in the case of unskilled labor layoﬀs.
Real GDP declines in the short term, and returns to baserun levels in the
longer run. Nevertheless, there is positive growth over time in every produc-
tion sector other than public services, including the rural and urban informal
sectors. Accordingly, while the aggregate growth impact is neutral in the
l o n gt e r md u et ol o w e rv a l u ea d d e di nt h ep u b l i cs e c t o r ,t h eg r o w t hp a t hh a s
a distinct upward trend towards the end of the 10-year horizon. Positive for-
mal sector growth is particularly evident throughout the simulation period.
Short-term growth is due to increased employment of unskilled labor in the
private sector, whereas long-term growth is mainly driven by higher private
capital accumulation. In fact, employment of unskilled labor in the private
30sector falls over time and returns close to baserun levels in the long term.
At the same time, growth in the rural agricultural and urban informal sec-
tors are driven primarily by increased labor supplies, due to the cumulative
impact of outward migration from the urban (formal) sector. Outward mi-
gration is particularly strong because declining employment prospects lowers
the expected urban wage.
The unskilled unemployment rate increases sharply in the short term,
because the rise in private sector employment is insuﬃcient to absorb laid-
oﬀ workers in the public sector. In the longer run, unskilled unemployment
returns toward its baserun level, due to the cumulative eﬀect of migration
outﬂows into the urban informal and rural sectors. Accordingly, formal sec-
tor employment of unskilled labor is reduced to baserun levels, whereas the
supply of unskilled labor in the formal sector declines by more than 1 percent
in the long term. International migration ﬂows increase in the short term
but move in the opposite direction in the longer term due to higher domestic
wages and lower unemployment levels.
In contrast to layoﬀs of unskilled government workers, layoﬀs of skilled
public employees have markedly positive growth eﬀects. Real GDP increases
in both the short and the long term. Again, output growth occurs in all non-
public sectors, but in contrast to the previous experiment involving unskilled
labor layoﬀs, more balanced and stronger growth is recorded among the rural
and urban informal and formal sectors. Strong formal sector growth is driven
by increased employment of (skilled) labor in the short term. Thus, the
short-term impact of skilled labor layoﬀs follows the pattern of unskilled
layoﬀs. However, the long-term growth eﬀect is driven by a combination of
increased employment levels and private capital accumulation. Thus, the
initial increase in the level of (skilled) labor employment persists in the long
term, in contrast with the unskilled labor layoﬀs.
Growth in the rural and urban informal sectors is again driven by declin-
ing urban migration ﬂows, resulting from layoﬀs of unskilled labor in the
private sector. Sharply declining skilled labor wages (resulting from reduced
union wage demands, due to increased unemployment among skilled workers)
leads to increased substitution of skilled for unskilled labor in the private
formal sector. The accompanying narrowing in wage diﬀerentials leads to
declining urban (formal) migration and increasing rural and urban informal
labor supplies. This leads to a decline in the open unskilled unemployment
rate, and an accompanying increase in the expected urban formal sector
wage, which partly reverses the strong initial reduction in migration from
31the formal sector. But high and increasing informal sector wages means that
formal sector migration remain lower in the long term.
In line with the previous experiment involving layoﬀs of unskilled workers
in the public sector, layoﬀs of skilled workers lead to higher unemployment
for that category of labor while reducing unemployment among unskilled
workers. Moreover, the reduction in unskilled unemployment is magniﬁed in
the longer run by the fall in the supply of unskilled labor in the formal sector
induced by migration ﬂows. This long-term reduction is, however, markedly
smaller than in the case of unskilled layoﬀs. The increase in informal and
f o r m a lu r b a nw a g e s ,c o m b i n e dw i t ht h ed e c l i n i n go p e nu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e ,
means that international migration ﬂo w sd e c l i n ea sw e l li nt h el o n gr u n .
T h ec u m u l a t i v ee ﬀect on the domestic workforce abroad again leads to an
increasing deﬁcit in the net factor services account over time. This is made
up for by a moderate improvement in the trade balance, which comes about
through a small real exchange rate depreciation.
The main impact of public sector layoﬀs on the government budget is
to reduce current consumption and domestic government borrowing require-
ments. In contrast, transfers to the pension system remain relatively un-
changed. Overall, pension payments decline by around 0.2 percent in the
long run. In the case of unskilled layoﬀs, the decline in pension payments are
due solely to a decline in the number of retirees. Layoﬀs of unskilled workers
result in the largest reduction in employment, and therefore result in the
largest reduction in pensioners. In contrast, layoﬀs of skilled workers lead to
lower pension payments partly because of declining numbers of retirees, and
partly because of a declining average beneﬁt rate. A stronger supply eﬀect of
skilled labor layoﬀs leads to declining formal sector prices and, accordingly,
to an increasing pension beneﬁt rate.
5.4 Subsidies to Private Employment
We now turn to an analysis of the impact of subsidies to employment of un-
skilled labor in the formal private sector under various government budget
closures, including a) a non-neutral budget closure; b) a budget-neutral in-
crease in sales taxes on private formal sector goods, and c) a budget-neutral
increase in income taxes on capitalists. In each case, the increase in employ-
ment subsidy amounts to 5 percent of the base year private formal unskilled
wage level. The simulation results are summarized in Figure 8.
The employment subsidy for unskilled labor increases the diﬀerential be-
32tween skilled and unskilled labor costs, in a manner similar to the 5 percent
reduction in payroll taxes considered earlier. The only diﬀerence between
the two sets of results comes from the fact that the payroll tax rate applies
to the unskilled wage rate whereas the employment subsidy does not. The
unskilled wage rate is ﬁxed in real terms, but variations in consumer prices
in the formal sector leads to some variation in its nominal value. However,
these wage changes have minimal impact on the results, which are therefore
almost identical to the results of the payroll tax experiments.
In particular, the reduction in unskilled labor costs leads to a strong
increase in formal sector employment and a decline in open unskilled un-
employment. The increase in unskilled employment is the main engine for
formal sector growth. Initial migration ﬂows also fuel increases in labor sup-
ply in the informal sector. However, subsequent outward migration from
urban to rural areas leads to an increase in rural labor supply, and the initial
increase in informal sector labor supply therefore tapers oﬀ. In the long term,
aggregate growth is driven equally by rural and urban formal sector growth,
when a non-neutral government budget closure is used. An increase in the
public sector borrowing requirement leads to crowding-out of private invest-
ment, reduced capital accumulation, and depressed formal sector growth. In
contrast, urban formal sector growth is markedly stronger than rural agri-
cultural growth when employment subsidies are ﬁnanced by higher income
tax revenues. The domestic government borrowing requirement is eliminated
and crowding-out of investment is reversed, leading to slightly increased cap-
ital accumulation in the long term. Unemployment among skilled workers
increases slightly, regardless of the government budget closure. In contrast,
strongly increasing labor demand in the private sector reduces the unskilled
unemployment rate, in spite of a sharp long-term increase in labor supply.
The deﬁcit of the net factor services acount increases due to the cumulative
eﬀect of reduced international migration, but a compensating improvement
in the trade balance means that the current account balance is left essentially
unchanged. Finally, pensions payments increase marginally, due to a rela-
tively strong increase in the number of retirees (itself resulting from a rise in
formal sector employment) and a smaller decline in the pension beneﬁtr a t e
(due to declining formal sector prices).18
18A limitation of our analysis is that we do not account for the fact that employment
subsidies may have unintended consequences, such as subsidized workers replacing unsub-
sidized ones, or employers ﬁring subsidized workers once the subsidy period ends.
335.5 Reduction in Unions’ Bargaining Strength
We now turn our attention to a reduction in labor union bargaining strength.
To do so we reduce the bargaining strength parameter, the coeﬃcient ν in
equation (17), from its initial level of 0.7 to a value of 0.6. The results are
shown in Figure 9.
The direct impact of the reduction in union bargaining power is to lower
skilled wages and increase employment for skilled labor in the private sector.
Increased production leads to lower formal sector goods prices and increased
real demand for all goods, including agricultural and informal sector goods.
The expansion of real private investment demand is particularly large. In-
creasing real demand, combined with a lower wage bill, raises ﬁrms’ proﬁts in
the private formal sector. In turn, this boosts private savings and investment.
The combination of higher skilled employment, and capital accumulation in
the private sector, and increased unskilled employment in urban informal
and rural sectors, leads to a rise in output, which persists in the long term.
This growth scenario is therefore broad-based in the sense that it stems from
both rural and urban formal sector growth, and to a lesser extent from urban
informal sector growth.
The sharp drop in skilled wages leads to strong substitution away from
unskilled labor in the urban formal sector. Although the large initial decline
in private formal unskilled employment is partly reversed over time, it re-
mains below its baseline value in the long term, as a result of the permanent
n a t u r eo ft h er e d u c t i o ni nt h ew a g ed i ﬀerential. Growth in the formal sector
is thus driven by increased employment of skilled labor and private capital
accumulation. The strong initial substitution away from unskilled labor also
leads to high unemployment for that category of labor and a drop in expected
urban wages. This leads to a marked initial decline in formal sector migra-
tion ﬂows, and an equally large initial increase in labor supply in the informal
sector. However, the strong migration response also reduces unemployment
to below baserun levels. This increases the expected urban wage and, subse-
quently, leads to a reversal in the direction of formal sector migration ﬂows.
In the longer run, migration ﬂows tend to increase labor supply in the urban
informal sector at a constant rate and labor supply in the rural sector at an
increasing rate. This leads to relatively fast long-term growth in the rural
sector and slower but robust growth in the urban informal sector.
After an initial adjustment period, formal sector unemployment rates
drop well below baserun levels and stay there in the long term. The reduc-
34tion in skilled unemployment follows from increased employment of skilled
labor in the private sector. In contrast, the long-term reduction in unskilled
unemployment follows from a reduction in the formal sector supply of un-
skilled labor, resulting itself from reduced migration ﬂows.
The international wage diﬀerential drops in the long term, leading to
a decline in overseas migration ﬂows. This contrasts with the long-term
decline in migration between rural and urban areas, where a high degree of
persistence implies weak migration ﬂows, in spite of a long-term increase in
the wage diﬀerential.
The decline in international migration leads to an increase in the net fac-
tor services income deﬁcit. This reduction is counterbalanced in the long term
by an improvement in the trade balance. The government budget is char-
acterized by long-term declines in overall income- and expenditure-to-GDP
ratios, and by a long-term decline in the domestic borrowing requirement,
which allows for crowding-in of private investment. Government transfers
to the pension system do not change signiﬁcantly. Looking at the overall
pension system, pension payments increase only slightly in the long run. An
increase in the number of retirees is evened out by a drop in the pension
beneﬁt rate. The increase in the number of retirees follows from increased
private sector (skilled) employment, whereas the reduction in the pension
beneﬁt rate follows from declining formal sector prices associated with the
strong formal sector supply response.
5.6 A Composite Reform Program
Finally, we consider a composite, “realistic” package of policies, which com-
bines reductions in payroll taxes on unskilled labor with a reduction in unions’
bargaining strength, and a cut in unskilled employment in the public sector.
We assume that the payroll tax on unskilled labor is reduced by 5 percentage
points, the number of unskilled workers in the public sector is reduced by 5
percent, and that the bargaining strength of trade unions is reduced from an
initial level of 0.7 to a “neutral” value of 0.6. We consider the three alterna-
tive budget closure rules speciﬁed above, but to save space we do not report
the results graphically.
Given that the transmission channels of each of the individual compo-
nents of the composite program have been described extensively in previous
s e c t i o n s ,w er e s t r i c to u ra t t e n t i o nh e r et ot h ei m p a c ta n dl o n g - r u ne ﬀects of
the program on growth and unemployment. Simulation results with a non-
35neutral public deﬁcit closure do not show evidence of large nonlinear eﬀects.
Speciﬁcally, the impact and long-term eﬀects on the growth rate of aggre-
gate real value added amount to 0.2 and 0.9 percent, respectively. This is
approximately equal to the sum of the growth rates derived from the individ-
ual simulations described earlier. Similarly, the impact and long-term eﬀects
on private formal sector employment are very close to linear, amounting to
—0.1 and 4.0 percent respectively for unskilled labor, and 3.2 and 3.1 percent
respectively for skilled labor. Unskilled employment increases slightly by 0.2
percent when income taxes are used to keep the public deﬁcit unchanged.
Overall, although the simultaneous implementation of the individual compo-
n e n t so ft h ea b o v es p e c i ﬁed policy reform package does bring some beneﬁts
(suggesting therefore that complementarity between labor market policies is
desirable from an economic point of view, independently of other, political
economy considerations) the impact of a “realistic” package of labor market
reforms on growth and employment does not appear to be large. This has
important implications for the design of adjustment programs in a region
where the challenge is not only to reduce an existing high level of unemploy-
ment, but also to create suﬃcient jobs to absorb new entrants in the labor
force.
6 Summary and Policy Lessons
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze the impact of labor market re-
forms on growth, real and relative wages, and the composition of employment
and unemployment in labor-exporting MENA countries. We ﬁrst provided a
brief overview of the main features of the labor market in some of these coun-
tries. We then presented a simulation model, based on the IMMPA frame-
work developed by Agénor (2003), Agénor, Izquierdo and Fofack (2003), and
Agénor, Fernandes, and Haddad (2003), which captures many of these fea-
tures (such as a large informal urban sector, a signiﬁcant role of public sector
employment and “leadership eﬀects” of public sector wages, powerful trade
unions, and international migration of labor), as well as other important
structural characteristics of these countries (such as a pay-as-you-go pension
system). After discussing the calibration procedure and our choices of para-
meter values, we presented and discussed a series of simulation experiments.
We focused on a reduction in payroll taxation on unskilled labor, reductions
in public sector wages and workforce, an increase in employment subsidies to
36the private sector, changes in the bargaining strength of trade unions, and
a composite reform package involving several of these policies. In the case
of payroll taxation, employment subsidies and the composite package, we
considered both neutral and non-neutral changes. Speciﬁcally, we considered
three alternative ﬁscal “closure” rules. In the ﬁrst, we assumed no oﬀset-
ting change in revenue, and the government borrows domestically to balance
its budget–implying full crowding out of private investment. In the second
and third, the policy is budget-neutral, and the government raises respec-
tively sales taxes on the private, formal sector good, and income taxes on
capitalist-rentier households, to cover increased expenditures (due to an in-
creased deﬁcit in the pension system and increased labor subsidy payments).
Therefore, there is no crowding out of private capital formation in the second
and third experiments.
There are a number of policy lessons that emerge from our results. For
instance, we found that, regardless of how a cut in payroll taxes on un-
skilled labor is ﬁnanced (either by borrowing from the private sector, or
by implementing revenue-neutral changes in sales or income taxation), re-
duced labor costs lead to increased employment of unskilled labor, as well as
substitution away from skilled labor (and physical capital) in the private for-
mal sector. A decrease in skilled labor wages–resulting from a rise in skilled
unemployment–partly oﬀsets the tax-induced increase in the diﬀerential be-
tween skilled and unskilled labor costs. The net increase in the labor cost
diﬀerential is still very signiﬁcant in the longer term, implying a strong sub-
stitution away from skilled labor toward unskilled labor even in the long run.
At the same time, our results showed that the overall rate of output growth
varies signiﬁcantly across experiments–essentially because the behavior of
private investment depends very much (as could be expected) on whether or
not there are oﬀsetting changes in taxes. When the increase in the budget
deﬁcit resulting from a cut in the payroll tax is ﬁnanced through domestic
borrowing, private investment is crowded out; the lower rate of capital accu-
mulation has an adverse eﬀect on growth and thus on the demand for both
categories of labor. Thus, the indirect or “level” eﬀect on the demand for
unskilled labor may mitigate signiﬁcantly the substitution eﬀect triggered by
the change in relative labor costs. The results associated with a reduction
in trade unions’ bargaining power in wage negotiations also indicate large
long-term gains in overall employment associated with general equilibrium
eﬀects.
The main policy lessons of our simulation experiments can be summarized
37as follows. The ﬁr s ti st h a t ,i na s s e s s i n gt h ei m p a c to fl a b o rm a r k e tr e f o r m s
on growth and unemployment, it is important to account not only for the
direct (partial equilibrium) eﬀects of these policies, but also for their indirect
(general equilibrium) eﬀects on income and aggregate demand (resulting from
changes in the government budget). For instance, it has been argued that a
policy of subsidizing employment in the private sector would help to reduce
unemployment in MENA countries. A simple, partial equilibrium analysis of
this policy is indeed unambiguous: by lowering the relative cost of unskilled
labor, a subsidy leads to an increase in the demand for that category of labor,
which may be particularly signiﬁcant if wages are ﬁxed (as a result, say, of
a binding minimum wage). As long as the increase in labor demand does
not prompt greater participation in the labor force (that is, if unskilled labor
supply is fairly inelastic), unskilled unemployment is thus likely to fall.
However, a partial equilibrium view can be misleading. The increase in
subsidies must be ﬁnanced, and this can occur in a variety of ways. Our
experiments indicate that general equilibrium eﬀects can be signiﬁcant, even
with a fairly neutral investment speciﬁcation. Accordingly, if spending is
kept constant, and the government chooses to let its ﬁscal deﬁcit increase and
borrow from the rest of the economy, this can have a large crowding-out eﬀect
on private investment, if private savings do not adjust quickly; the fall in
investment may, over time, restrain the expansion of demand for all categories
of labor–including unskilled labor. Thus, the longer-run eﬀect of the policy
on employment may be either nil or negative. Similarly, an increase in, say,
taxes on capitalist-rentier households may restrain private capital formation
and have an adverse eﬀect on employment in the medium and the long run.
More speciﬁcally, our general equilibrium analysis indicates that the overall
impact of a change in payroll taxes on the demand for unskilled labor may
be compounded, or mitigated, depending on how the government chooses to
adjust its tax and spending instruments to maintain a balanced budget. In
the presence of large crowding-out eﬀects on private investment (and possibly
savings), the direct gains (in terms of higher employment) associated with
a reduction in payroll taxes may be highly mitigated. Similarly, whether
employment subsidies end up reducing open unemployment in the formal
sector may depend on the extent to which a higher perceived probability of
ﬁnding a job in that sector aﬀects workers’ decision to remain in the informal
sector.
The second policy lesson is that our simulation results indicate that a
“piecemeal” approach to labor market reforms is unlikely to bring substantial
38beneﬁts in terms of growth and employment. By contrast, a comprehensive
approach will bring broad-based growth and reductions in both skilled and
unskilled unemployment. The idea that labor market reform programs must
be suﬃciently broad (in the sense of covering a wide range of complementary
policies) and deep (of substantial magnitude) to have much of an eﬀect is em-
phasized by Coe and Snower (1997) and Orszag and Snower (1998). At the
same time, however, although a “realistic” package of policies (which com-
bines reductions in payroll taxes on unskilled labor, a reduction in unions’
bargaining strength, and a cut in unskilled employment in the public sector)
may have a signiﬁcant impact on the composition of employment in labor-
exporting MENA countries, fostering a sustained increase in growth rates
and job creation in these countries may require a more comprehensive pro-
gram of structural reforms–involving, in particular, ﬁnancial sector reforms,

































































































19Unless otherwise indicated, the indexes i and j,w i t hi,j = A,I,P,G refer to produc-
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PEi = wpeiER, for i = A,P (A52)
PM i = wpmi(1 + tmi)ER, for i = A,P (A53)
PXi =
PD iDi + PE iEi
Xi
, for i = A,P (A54)
PQ i =
PD iDi + PM iMi
Qi
, for i = A,P (A55)









































PROFi = PViVi − WiUi, for i = A,I (A63)
PROF P = PVPVP − [(1 + ptaxU)WM − ESU]UP (A64)
−[(1 + ptaxS)WS − ESS]SP
YF i = PROFi, for i = A,I (A65)
YF P =( 1− entax)PROFP − IF · ER· FLP,−1 (A66)
YH A = γATRH+ PVAVA (A67)
YH I = γITRH+ PV IVI +( 1− τF)ER· REMIT (A68)
YH F = PENSIONS+ γFTRH+( WMUP + WUGUG) (A69)
+(WSSP + WSGSG)+τFER· REMIT
YH KR = γKRTRH+( 1− re)YF P (A70)
CONSUMPTION, SAVINGS, AND INVESTMENT
SAVh = srh(1 − inctaxh)YH h (A71)
CONh =( 1− inctaxh)YH h − SAVh (A72)
PK·ZP +PQPZG = re·YF P +
X
h
SAVh −CDEF +ER(∆FLP +∆FLG)
(A73)
KP =( 1− δP)KP,−1 + ZP,−1 (A74)
GOVERNMENT
−CDEF = TXREV − TRH− TRSOC− WSGS
E
G (A75)
−NG− IFGER· FL G,−1
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PQ PZG = IINF + IE + IH (A78)
Ki =( 1− δi)Ki,−1 +
Ii,−1
PQ P,−1
, where i = INF,H,E (A79)
KG = αG{βGK
−ρG











BENEF = BENEF−1(1 + ∆lnPF,−1) (A82)

















(wpeiEi − wpmiMi)+REMIT − IF · FL P,−1 (A86)
−IFGFLG,−1 + ∆FLG + ∆FLP
REMIT = WFORFORL −1 (A87)
FORL=( 1− δIMIG)FORL −1 + IMIG (A88)
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Variable Names and Deﬁnitions20
Endogenous Variables
BENEF Average pension beneﬁt
Ci Consumption of good i by the urban and rural private sector
Cih Consumption of good i by household h
CONh Total nominal consumption by household h
CDEF Current public budget deﬁcit
Di Domestic demand for good i = A,P
Ei Export of traded goods for i = A,P
ESS Nominal employment subsidy on skilled labor
in the private sector
ESU Nominal employment subsidy on unskilled labor
in the private sector
EwU Expected urban unskilled wage
EwA Expected agricultural wage
FORL Stock of domestic workers abroad
Gi Government spending on good i = A,G,P
IMIG International migration
INTi Intermediate good demand for good i
KE Public capital in education
KG Total Public capital
KH Public Capital in health
KINF Public capital in infrastructure
KP Private capital
Mi Imports of good i = A,P
MIG Migration to urban area
NEWPEN Flow of skilled and unskilled workers retiring in each period
NUMPEN Number of pensioners
ODEF Overall budget deﬁcit
PF Formal urban price index
PR Rural price index
PS Price index for skilled labor
PURB Urban price index
20Unless otherwise indicated, the index i = A,I,P,G refers to production sectors and
h = A,I,F,KR to households.
46PD i Domestic price of domestic sales of good i = A,P
PE i Price of exported good i = A,P
PENSIONS Total amount of pension paid to pensioners
PK Price of capital
PM i Price of imported good i = A,P
PQ i Composite good price of good i
PROFi Proﬁts by ﬁrms in sector i = A,I,P
PT 1 Price of composite input T1
PT 2 Price of composite input T2
PV i Value added price of good i
PX i Sales price of good i
Qs
i,Q d
i Composite supply and demand of good i




P Demand for skilled workers in private urban formal
sector
SAVh Saving by household h
srh Saving rate for household h
SKL New skilled workers
SP Skilled labor employed in private urban formal
T1 Composite input from T2 and unskilled labor
T2 Composite input from capital and skilled labor
TRH Transfers to households
TRSOC Net government pension transfers
TXREV Tax revenues
Ui Unskilled labor employed in sector i = A,I,P
UR Unskilled workers in rural sector
Us
R Unskilled labor supply in the rural sector
UU Unskilled workers in urban sector
Ud
i Demand for labor in sector i = A,I,P
US
F Unskilled labor supply in the urban formal sector
US
I Unskilled labor supply in the informal sector
UNEMPS Skilled unemployment rate
UNEMPU Unskilled unemployment rate in the formal sector
Vi Value added in sector i
47Wi Nominal wage for labor employed in sector i = A,I
wi Real wage rate for unskilled labor employed in sector
i = A,I
WM Minimum wage (unskilled labor in urban formal
private sector)
wM Real minimum wage (unskilled labor in urban formal
private sector)
WS Nominal wage rate for skilled worker in the private urban
formal sector
wS Real wage rate for skilled worker in the private urban formal
sector
WSG Nominal wage rate for skilled labor in the government sector
wSG Skilled wage in the public sector, real terms
WUG Nominal wage rate for unskilled labor in the government
sector
wUG Unskilled wage in the public sector, real terms
xih Subsistence level of consumption of good i by household h
Xi Production of good i
YF i Income by ﬁrms in sector i = A,I,P
YH h Household income for household h
Z Total investment demand
Zi Investment demand for good i = P,G
Zi




entax Corporate income tax
ER Nominal exchange rate
EwFOR Expected real foreign wage (in terms of domestic prices)
FLi Foreign loans to sector i = G,P
GC Government consumption
gR Population growth in rural economy
gSG Growth rate of the skilled labor force in the public sector
gUG Growth rate of the unskilled labor force in the public sector
gU P o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hi nu r b a ne c o n o m y
IE Investment in education
IF Foreign interest rate
IFG Interest rate on government foreign loans
IH Investment in health
IINF Investment in infrastructure
inctaxh Income tax rate for h
indtaxi Rate of indirect taxation of output in sector i
NG Total government current expenditure on goods and services
ptaxS Payroll tax for skilled labor in private urban sector
ptaxU Payroll tax for unskilled labor in private urban sector
SG Skilled workers in public sector
SE
G Skilled labor in the public sector engaged in education
ST
G Total number of skilled workers in the public sector
tmi Import tariﬀ for good i = A,P
UG Unskilled workers in public sector
WFOR Nominal foreign wage
wpei World price of export for i = A,P





αG Shift parameter in the public capital equation
αQi Shift parameter in the total supply function of good i = A,P
αTi Shift parameter in transformation function
between exported and domestic production of good i = A,P
αXi Shift parameter in production of good i = A,I,P
αXP1 Shift parameter in composite input of unskilled
and skilled/capital composite input
αXP2 Shift parameter in composite input of skilled workers and private
capital
βE Parameter determining the weight of skilled labor in
production of education
βF Speed of adjustment for the supply of unskilled labor in
the formal private sector
βG Share parameter in the public capital equation
βQA Shift parameter in agricultural composite good
βQP Shift parameter in urban composite good
βTi Shift parameter between exported and domestic
production of good i = A,P
βXi Shift parameter in production of good i = A,I,P
βXP1 Share parameter between unskilled and skilled/capital
composite input
βXP2 Share parameter between skilled workers and private capital
ccih Shares of household h in consumption of good i
δE Depreciation rate of education capital
δH Depreciation rate of health capital
δINF Depreciation rate of infrastructure
δIMIG Rate of “attrition” of the stock of migrants
δ
S
NP Rate of skilled retirement in the urban formal sector
δ
U
NP Rate of unskilled retirement in the urban formal sector
δE Sensitivity of skilled eﬀort level to relative wages
δP Depreciation rate of private capital
δS Rate of “depreciation” or “de-skilling” of the skilled labor
50εSd
P/WS Wage elasticity of the demand for skilled labor
ϕ Productivity of public workers engaged in providing education
ϕm Minimum level of eﬀort
ηXA Coeﬃcient of returns to scale in the agricultural value
added function
γh Share of transfers allocated to household h
ggi Share of government expenditure on good i = A,G,P
κS Shift parameter for skilled private sector employment
λim Speed of adjustment in the international migration equation
λm Partial adjustment rate on migration
φj Parameters determining the nominal wage rate for the skilled labor
for j =1 ,2
re Percentage of proﬁts retained
ρE Substitution parameter between skilled labor in production of
education and educational capital stock
ρG Substitution parameter in the public capital equation
ρQi Substitution parameter in total supply of good i = A,P
ρTi Substitution parameter between exported and domestic
production of good i = A,P
ρXi Substitution parameter in production of good i = A,P
ρXP1 Substitution parameter between unskilled and
skilled/capital composite input
ρXP2 Substitution parameter between skilled workers and private capital
σIM Elasticity of international migration ﬂows with respect to
expected wages
σM Elasticity of migration ﬂows with respect to expected wages
σQA Elasticity of agricultural composite good
σQP Elasticity of private urban composite good
σS Elasticity of saving rate to deposit rate
σTi Elasticity of transformation between exported and domestic
production of good i = A,P
σXP1 Elasticity of substitution between unskilled workers
and composite input of skilled workers and private capital
σXP2 Elasticity of substitution between skilled workers and private capital
τF Fraction of remittances that are allocated to households in
the formal sector
51θU Share of urban unskilled workers employed in formal sector
υ Measure of the trade union’s bargaining power
wfi Initial share of good i in consumption of formal sector goods
wri Relative weight of good i in rural consumption
wui Initial share of good i in urban unskilled workers’ consumption
zzi Share of investment expenditure on good i = G,P
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Note: Years are given next to bars.  Figure 2 
A Stylized View of the Labor Market in Labor-Exporting MENA Countries
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5 Percentage Reduction in Unskilled Labor Payroll Tax Rate
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5 Percentage Points Reduction in Public Sector Unskilled Labor Employment
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Reduction in Labor Union's Bargaining Strength
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